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One of the more insightful explanations for economic progress in
industrialized nations during the last half of the Twentieth Century has
been the recognition of "human resources as the wealth of nations." The
notion has long enjoyed a rhetorical appeal by politicians in democratic
societies. But awareness that the principle has enormous economic
implications for national and international well-being has essentially been
a post-World War II phenomena. Increasingly, policymakers in industrialized
nations have realized that the human resource development of their labor
forces is the key to efforts to address such difficult issues as efficiency,
equity, stabilization, and growth. Nations with limited physical resources,
such as Japan and Germany, have sustained superior economic performances
in this new post-industrial era largely because they have been forced to
develop their human resources. All industrial democracies have come to
appreciate the wisdom of Ray Marshall's observation that "developed, educated,
motivated people are an unlimited resource...[while] underdeveloped,
uneducated, unmotivated people are a monumental drag on an economy in the
internationalized information era" of contemporary times.
Human resource development is a popular political theme as long as all
that is required is words. But, perhaps as is also the case with NASA and
the conduct of its mission, successful human resource development requires
2a long term planning perspective and sustained financial support over time.
Our political system has its greatest difficulties when it is confronted
with long term issues. In many ways the system is better geared to responding
to sudden claps of thunder that result from short run events then it is to
addressing gradual barometric changes that occur overtime. It is the
cumulative effect of gradual changes overtime, however, that are what are
critical to the nation's welfare and survival.
Human resource development issues are also complicated by the fact that
they are intangible by nature. The political system is designed to provide
tangible signs of accomplishment -- post offices, highways, tanks, buildings,
dams, airports, parks, military bases and so on are always popular. These
tangible projects can stand as physical monuments to the politicians who
fought to provide them. They remain in the political district forever --
or at least for a political lifetime. They often provide media opportunities
whereby ribbons can be cut, newspaper stories can be written, TV pictures
can be shown, and, if the politician is lucky enough, the project may even
be named after him or her as a permanent reminder of past political
accomplishments.
But human resource development requires expenditures of funds on the
provision of skills, education, information, and mobility opportunities for
individual people. The payoff for these investments to individual
participants usually corne only years later. The human beneficiaries of these
efforts usually have no idea who fought to create the programs in which they
participated. Moreover, in our mobile society, the persons who benefit from
these endeavors often move from one place to another so that they may not
have the opportunity to vote or to support the politicians who are committed
to human resource issues. Thus, despite the rhetoric of support, actions
3in the political arena to support a sustained commitment to human resource
development in the United states are sorely lacking.
The Study of Human Resource Issues
One approach to the study of human resources is the quantitative
perspective. It examines the effects that population trends and
characteristics have on the size and composition of the civilian labor force
that is available for employment. Another is the qualitative vantage point.
It involves issues pertaining to the actual preparation of the available
labor supply for employment. In the contemporary era of rapid technological
change and enhanced international competition, all industrialized nations
are faced with the imperative of addressing qualitative issues. But no other
nation in the 1980s is simultaneously confronted with a labor force that
is growing as fast and whose composition is changing as rapidly as is that
of the United states. Constancy of size and homogeneity of composition are
convenient labor force assumptions of standard economic theory. Neither
propositions, however, are operational concepts for understanding the current
challenges to labor market adjustment and public policy formulation in the
United States.
The Relationship of Population to Labor Force Changes
A nation acquires its population in two ways: people are native born
within its boundaries or foreign born people immigrate for permanent or
temporary settlement. Alterations in the size and characteristics of the
population, in turn, are transmitted to the economy through labor force
participation.
Analysis of the size of the native born population that may be available
for employment over time is a relatively straightforward process. As the
people are already born and mortality tables are reasonably reliable, the
4available statistics pertaining to their potential number and their
characteristics are reasonably predictable. Accounting for the foreign born
portion of the population, however, has proven to be a more difficult task.
Immigration accounts for at least one-third of the annual growth rate
of the U.S. population (and probably a higher percentage of the labor force)
in the 1980s. It is anticipated that the percentage will increase in the
1990s. Despite the complex and highly legalistic nature of the nation's
immigration and refugee admission systems, there has been substantial illegal
immigration that has circumvented these formal procedures.
Immigration flows are less predictable because immigration policy in
the United states is set on purely political criteria. The economic
implications of various administrative decisions, judicial rulings, and
legislative changes that shape the size and composition of immigration flows
are never the subject of careful prior research. Thus, the employment
consequences of immigration and refugee policies cannot be adequately
anticipated. The recently enacted Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, for instance, contained four different amnesty programs that will allow
millions of illegal immigrants and others whose admission legality was
previously in question to adjust their status to become permanent resident
aliens. If they choose, all may eventually become naturalized citizens.
In some cases, the amnesty beneficiaries will be able to have their immediate
relatives (spouses, children, and adult parents) join them at once. All
will be able to reunify their families eventually. The new law also greatly
liberalized the provisions that allow foreign temporary workers and non-
immigrant workers in the future to be employed in the United States. Hence,
no one knows what the ultimate population and employment effects of this
historic legislation will be other than to say that millions of people will
5be involved over the next ten years.
As for the behavioral link between the population and the labor force,
it too has proven difficult to anticipate. Actual labor force participation
rates of sub-groups of the population vary at given points in time and have
also been found to be sensitive over time to changing unemployment rates,
inflation rates, fertility rates, family practices, and social attitudes.
Thus, the wise aphorism--attributed to the physicist Neils Bohr--that "it
is hard to predict, especially the future" applies with a vengeance to the
art of forecasting actual labor force size or behavior.
Labor Force Definition
As with all economic measures, the civilian labor force has a particular
statistical definition. The civilian labor force is composed of all persons
in the non-institutionalized population over 16 years of age who have a job
plus those who meet a specific definition as being unemployed. The unemployed
are those persons in the non-institutionalized population who are 16 years
of age or older and who are willing, able, available, and "actively seeking"
work but who have been unable to find paid employment for one hour in the
survey week each month.
The civilian labor force, however, does not include those persons who
want to work but who, due to the state of the economy, have abandoned active
search for a job because they feel that such efforts would be fruitless.
Such potential labor force participants are called "discouraged workers".
Research has shown that the more people who are unemployed at any given time,
the more who tend to be discouraged (and visa versa). It also reveals that
women in general as well as younger and older men are most likely to be
affected by this phenomenon.
With the high aggregate unemployment levels of the mid-1980s, the number
6of discouraged workers has held at the high level of about 1.2 million persons
over the past three years. Because they are not "actively seeking" a job,
discouraged workers are not officially counted as being unemployed and,
therefore, are excluded from being counted in the civilian labor force.
On the other hand, the definition of the civilian labor force does
include as being employed all persons who desire to work full-time but who
can only find part-time jobs due to prevailing economic conditions. In the
first quarter of 1987, the involuntarily part-time employed work force
totalled a very high figure of 5.4 million workers.
Thus, the official definition of the civilian labor force has
limitations. It should be no surprise, therefore, to learn that the
definition of who should be included and who should not is, periodically,
a heated subject of both political and professional controversy.
The Unique Experience of the United states
Since the mid-1970s, the civilian labor force of the United States has
been growing at a sustained pace of about 2.2 million net additional job
seekers a year (from 93 million in 1975 to 117.8 million in 1986). In terms
of those actually able to find employment, their numbers also have increased
significantly from 85.8 million to 109.5 million over this same time span.
This growth in absolute numbers is not to be found in comparisons with any
of the other major industrial powers of the free world (see Table 1). Only
Canada and Japan have shown any appreciable absolute increases in the size
of their respective labor forces over this period.
In two countries -- Germany and Great Britain, the number of employed
persons was actually smaller in 1985 than it was in 1975 (i.e., they have
sustained negative growth in employment and soaring unemployment). For
France, Italy, and the Netherlands, employment changes have been barely
Employment United Canada Australia Japan France West Great Italy Nether- Sweden
status and states Germany Britain lands
Year
Labor force
1975 93,775 9,974 6,169 52,530 21,600 26,130 25,130 20,080 4,820 4,123
1986 117 ,834 12,870 7,562 59,410 23,480 27,280 27,460 21,990 5,710* 4,437
Absolute
Growth 24,059 2,896 1,393 6,880 1,880 1,150 2,330 1,910 890 314
*Note: Data is for 1985
Source: U.S. Department of Labor
Table 1 International Comparison of Growth of u.s. Labor Force
With 10 Other Industrialized Nations, 1975 and 1986.
.....
8positive and the ranks of the unemployed swelled. Canada and Australia have
been able to provide more jobs but not at a sufficient pace to keep their
unemployment rates from significantly increasing. Even Japan and Sweden
have sustained increases in unemployment but their rates still remain below
what would be considered to be full employment in other countries.
While it is true that the u.S. economy has generated an enormous number
of jobs over this period, it has not been able to create enough employment
opportunities to keep its unemployment rate from drifting upward. Indeed,
as is shown in Table 2, unemployment rates during periods of general
prosperity since 1950 have tended to drift upward. Prior to World War II,
the u.S. economy was subject to roller coaster-like swings in its unemployment
experience. But with the advent and application of macroeconomic policies
(i.e., fiscal and monetary policies) since World War II, the wild gyrations
in the u.S. economy have been modulated. On the other hand, the gradual
upward creep in the unemployment rate since 1950 (see trend line in Table
2) indicates that the u.S. economy is confronted with increasing labor force
adjustment difficulties. Because the labor force is not homogeneous, the
composition of its growth is crucial to understanding and to formulating
the human resource policies needed to ease adjustment.
Explanations for u.S. Labor Force Growth
There are three major forces that have contributed to the rapid growth
of the u.S. labor force over the past decade. Each of these pressures has
also exerted significant influences on the gender, age, and racial composition
of the labor force. They pertain to the unprecedented number of women who
have sought entry into the labor market; the maturing of the post-World War
II "baby boom" population cohort; and the acceleration in the number of
immigrants coming to the United States. All of these factors are likely
20
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to varying degrees to continue to exert considerable influence into the 1990s.
Each deserves brief elaboration.
Female Workers
More women in both absolute and relative terms have been entering and
staying longer in the labor force than at any previous time in the nation's
history. The movement has been so abrupt and so large that it can be fairly
described as being a "social revolution" in its own right. Two out of every
three new labor market entrants since 1975 have been women and the same
pattern is forecast to continue through 1995. The labor force participation
rate of all women has risen sharply from 33.9 percent in 1950 to 54.4 percent
in 1986. In total, women constituted about 45 percent of the civilian labor
force in 1986 and it is projected that this percentage will increase to 47
percent by 1995.
The contributing factors for this growth rests with the rapidly
increasing participation rate of married women in general and married women
with children in particular. It is the labor market behavior of these
particular female workers that represents the dramatic departure from the
past. Single adult women were usually in the labor market. Married women
and women with children were not. The participation rate of married women
has risen from 23.8 percent to 54.7 percent from 1950 to 1986. The rate
for women (married or not) with children under 18 years of age has grown
from 45.9 percent in 1975 to 54.7 in 1986. For women with children under
3 years of age it has risen from 34.1 percent to 50.8 percent over this same
span. Under these circumstances of rapid change of social behavior, no one
can predict what the normal labor force participation rate for women will
prove to be. It is projected, however, that the female labor force
participation rate will continue to increase into the mid-1990s.
11
The reasons for the sudden acceleration of women in the labor market
are still the subject of debate. The movement was completely unpredicted
by both demographers and labor market forecasters. The mechanization of
housekeeping tasks since the end of World War II combined with the growing
acceptance of family planning and the availability of new methods to permit
the timing of birth occurrences, created a window of opportunity for the
social change to occur. The momentum to alter the status of women in the
work place was provided in the 1960s by the civil rights movement. Women
were not initially included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But as the
result of an amendment added during the floor debates in the House of
Representatives by southern politicians who sought to kill the entire bill,
prohibitions against sex discrimination in employment were included in the
final legislation. The moral force of the law, combined with the creation
of a legal enforcement mechanism, provided the emerging feminist movement
with a lever to attack barriers that had previously prevented women from
fully participating in the labor market.
The momentum for change was subsequently prodded by the prolonged period
of inflation that occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s. The corrosion
of real family incomes forced many women to find jobs in order to maintain
previous family standards of living. In the wake of these occurrences, there
has also been a surge in the number of female family householders. In 1985,
16.2 percent of all families were so constituted -- up from 10.8 percent
in 1970. For black families, the percentages increased from 28.3 percent
in 1970 to a staggering 43.7 percent in 1985. Aside from single adult women
who were usually in the labor force, widowhood, divorce, and pregnancies
outside of marriage have caused an increasing number of other women to be
the sole breadwinners for their families. As a consequence, many such women
12
have been forced to seek employment whether they actually wished to or not.
An important population corollary to the growth of female participation
in the labor market is the decline in family size. The number of children
per family in the United states has fallen from 3.2 in 1930 to about 1.8
in the mid-1980s. A sustained rate of 2.1 children per family is needed
for population replacement. The most significant encouragement to smaller
families has been provided by the aforementioned advance of married women
into the labor force. It is highly unlikely that women in the future will
abandon the financial and personal independence that they have come to
experience. This is especially the case given the fact divorce has become
so common (i.e., about half of all marriages will end up in divorce given
current averages). Thus, high labor force participation by women is likely
to be a permanent feature of the U.s. economy as will be the pattern of
smaller families.
One consequence of these family trends has been that the number of new
labor force entrants who are native born has been declining in the 1980s
and will continue to do so until the mid-1990s. But, as opposed to other
industrialized nations where similar declines in family size have occurred,
the growth in the labor force of the United States is likely to be only
marginally influenced, if at all. Immigration of foreign born persons will
likely serve as a substantial offset. Moreover, the "baby boom" generation
is having an echo effect (see Table 3). Due to their sheer large numbers,
the members of this age group are producing a large number of children even
though individual family sizes are shrinking. Between 1980 and 1986, the
number of children under age 5 grew by 10.9 percent (to 18,128,000 children
in 1986). It is the only age cohort under 24 years of age to show a positive
rate of increase over this period (see Table 4). Hence, by the late 1990s
13
Table 3
Age structure of the population
Percentage change from the Census of
April 1, 1980 to Ju ~ 1, 1986
Age Groups
Under 5
~~~,
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
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~
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Table 4
Age-group changes
. Her.e is: a'.. rundo\-\'n of. .the 'estimated
popu]atiol1 tQta1s, in. tl}ousands, by age
group as of July 1; 1986~'and the percent-
age cha'nge since. 198Q:'
.
.
Group. Total Change
Under age 5 18,128 10.9'
5 to 13". 30) ~ 46 -2.6
14 10 17 14,797. -8.9
18 to 24 27,973 -7.6
25 ~o 34 42.984 15.4
35t044 33,143 29.0
45 to 54 22, 822 O~1
55 to 64 22)230 2.4
6? to 74 17,32? 11.2
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the predicted decline in native born labor force entrants should be reversed.
The Maturing of the Population
The rapid growth of the labor force has also been significantly affected
by the age distribution of the U.S. population. It currently contains a
big "bulge" in the age range of between 25 and 44 years of age. Not only
is it the largest cohort of the population but it is also the most rapidly
growing. The bulge is a direct result of the labor force entry of the post-
World War II "baby boomers" (those born between 1946 and 1964) who have now
matured into prime working aged adults. Of the nation's population in 1986
of 241,596,000 people, a total of 76,127,000 were in this age cohort (or
31.5 percent of the total population) [see Table 4 again]. If this cohort
is broken into its two component parts, the age 25 to 34 grouping totals
42,984,000 persons (it grew by 15.4 percent between 1980 and 1986) while
the age 35 to 44 grouping contains 33,143,000 people (it grew by a whopping
29.0 percent between 1980 and 1986). Regardless of gender or race, persons
in the 25 to 44 years of age cohort of the population have the highest labor
force participation rates of the entire labor force. If ever a person is
going to seek work, it is most probable he or she will do so between these
ages. Fortune magazine has dubbed this population distribution of the 1980s
as being "demography's glad tidings" for the economy because it affords the
U.S. economy the potential for a significant productivity bonus. Thus, the
bulge is a "good" problem to be confronted with -- especially when its
implications are compared to the earlier time when this bulge was in its
youth (pre-1980) or what lies ahead in the future when this cohort enters
its retirement phase (post-2001).
In this regard, it is also necessary to note that the racial and ethnic
composition of the "baby boom" population is also affecting the composition
16
of the labor force. Although family size is decreasing for all major racial
and ethnic groups, the decline began earlier and has been more rapid for
non-Hispanic whites than for blacks and Hispanics. As a consequence, the
proportion of the labor force that is black has risen from 9.9 percent in
1975 to 10.7 percent in 1985 and the proportion that is Hispanic has grown
from 5.3 percent in 1980 to 6.7 percent in 1985. The labor force growth
rate of both groups has been increasing annually since 1980 at a faster rate
than that of the overall labor force. Together, blacks and Hispanics
accounted for 40 percent of the absolute growth in the labor force between
1980 and 1985. Data for other minority groups -- such as Asians -- are not
collected on a monthly and annual basis but their numbers are also known
to be growing rapidly. Thus, minority workers are becoming a larger
proportion of the labor force each year and they will continue to do so for
the remainder of this century.
The New Wave of Immigrants
The last factor contributing to the rapid growth of the u.s. labor force
is a unique phenomenon to the experience of the u.s. economy. It is
immigration. Since the mid-1960s, immigration has slowly re-emerged as a
key characteristic of the u.s. population and labor force. In stark contrast
to all other advanced industrial nations, the United states stands virtually
alone in its willingness to admit each year hundreds of thousands of legal
immigrants and refugees for permanent settlement as well as to tolerate mass
abuse of its laws by an even larger annual number of illegal immigrants.
As for the other industrialized nations, Japan accepts no immigrants
and few refugees. In Western Europe, the major industrialized countries
pursued temporary foreign worker policies in lieu of seeking permanent
immigrants to meet labor shortages in the post-World War II era. Since 1973-
17
4, however, even these "guestworker" policies have largely been abandoned
and little, if any, encouragement is now given for new immigrants. Most
of these nations have also taken much stronger steps in the 1980s than the
United States to discourage illegal immigration and to reduce refugee
admissions. With stagnant or declining labor forces, they have elected to
restrict entry and focus policy attention on the qualitative aspects of human
resource development for their citizens.
The 1980 census revealed that the size of the foreign-born population
of the United states had not only reversed its 50-year downward decline but
it had sustained a quantum increase. As a group, the reported foreign-born
population rose from 9.6 million in 1970 to 13.9 million persons in 1980
(an increase of 45 percent). No other grouping of the personal
characteristics of the population increased by a larger percentage between
1970 and 1980 than did the foreign born. The 1980 Census also disclosed
that one of every 10 people in the country spoke a language other than English
at home. As it is certain that there was a substantial statistical undercount
of the illegal immigrant population by the 1980 census, even these official
findings were surely understated. Given the momentous immigration
developments since 1980, it is certain that the foreign born population to
be recorded by the 1990 census will show another quantum leap. For this
reason, the demographer Leon Bouvier has warned that "there is a compelling
argument for close coordination between the formulation of employment and
immigration policy." So far, his pleas have gone unheeded.
Immigration is also contributing to dramatic changes in the racial and
ethnic composition of the U.S. population and labor force. About 85 percent
of the legal immigrants and refugees admitted to the United States since
the mid-1970s have come from either Latin America or Asia. Over this period,
18
the six countries of origin that account for the largest numbers of the new
legal immigrants and refugees are Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea,
China-Taiwan, and CUba. The last time a European country appeared as a major
source of new immigrants was in 1973 when Italy ranked fifth. Moreover,
it is undebatable that most illegal immigrants to the United states over
this same time span have also corne from Latin America and Asia. Many illegal
immigrants from these countries will be the beneficiaries of the new amnesty
programs. Thus, the population and the labor force of the United states
are both becoming more pluralistic in their ethnic and racial composition
than has ever before been the case.
Indeed, it was the recognition that United states does have serious
literacy and educational deficiency problems associated with its multi-racial
labor force that led the Prime Minister of Japan, Yasuhiro Nakasone to make
his infamous remarks in 1986 that Japan is "an intelligent society" and that
the U.s. is not. While it was absolutely wrong of him to explain the
difference purely in racial terms (since most educational experts explain
the performance differences between the races more on environmental
disadvantages that have confronted certain minority groups than on inheritable
genetic traits), statistically speaking he was correct. There are marked
differences in the performances of different racial groups on educational
tests; in the number of school drop-outs; and in the incidence of adult
illiteracy.
The Duel Impact of Immigration
Contemporary immigration to the United States seems to function like
an electrical charge that generates both positive and negative effects at
the same time. On the one hand, the flow of illegal immigrants, refugees,
asylees, and many legal immigrants admitted only because they have relatives
19
already in the United states seem to be flowing disproportionately into the
low wage labor markets of the United states. There they compete with the
large number (almost 30 percent of the nation's labor force) of citizens
workers who, unfortunately, are also seeking low paying jobs in the economy.
This flow of unskilled workers is also a major contributor to the mounting
need for social services in many urban areas of the nation. Immigration,
for instance, is the leading cause for the alarming growth in illiteracy
in the United States today. School drop out rates and high teenage pregnancy
rates are also contributors. But immigration is the major factor. Thus,
there is a social cost -- a heavy one -- associated with the fact that the
nation's immigration policy is not held accountable for its economic effects;
is governed largely by political objectives; and has yet to prove that it
is capable of combating the massive abuse of the system by illegal
immigration.
On the other hand, it is also the case that the pool or highly skilled
and educated workers in the United States is disproportionately composed
of foreign born persons and every indication is that it is going to become
more dependent upon them. In 1986, almost a quarter of the new Ph.D.
recipients in the United States were awarded to persons holding permanent
or temporary visas (see Table 5). In sciences and engineering the percentages
are far higher (almost 32 percent). In the physical sciences, almost one-
third of the Ph.D.'s awarded in 1986 were granted to persons holding permanent
or temporary visas; in engineering the percentage is over half; and in the
life sciences it was almost one-fifth. It is also the case that an increasing
percentage of those persons receiving Ph.D.'s who hold temporary visas are
electing to seek employment in the United States (see Table 6). The
percentage holding permanent visas who find employment in the U.s. is quite
20
TABLE 5. Percentage Distribution of Doctorate Recipients. by Citizenship and Broad
Field, 1962-1986*
Year of Doctorate
Field 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
Total, All Fields
83.4U.S. Citizens 85.6 84.5 79.7 81.9 78.4 72.3
Permanent Visas 2.4 3.5 5.3 5.5 4.4 3.9 4.5
Tcmpomy Visas 10.8 10.6 8.7 10.2 11.1 13.5 16.6
Physical Sciences
84.8 82.0 82.2U.S. Citizens 73.8 76.3 72.7 62.5
Permanent Visas 2.2 3.4 6.3 7.5 6.1 4.7 5.0
Tempomy Visas 11.9 11.9 10.1 14.8 15.4 19.5 26.2
Engineering
76.5 73.4 73.2U.S. Citizens 55.7 52.0 44.2 40.8
Permanent Visas 4.9 6.3 12.5 16.4 13.4 11.2 10.2
Tcmpomy Visas 17.9 16.7 13.7 22.4 31.7 38.9 40.6
Life Sciences
U.S. Citizens 79.8 77.3 80.2 74.3 79.9 80.8 75.9
Permanent Visas 2.7 3.3 5.2 6.4 4.3 3.2 3.6
Temporary Visas 16.7 18.0 13.9 14.7 13.3 13.1 15.2
Social Sciences
U.S. Citizens 85.4 83.4 85.1 82.7 84.8 82.2 77.9
pcnnancnt Visas 2.1 3.7 4.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.8
Tcmpomy Visas 10.5 10.2 8.7 8.8 8.1 9.2 11.5
Humanities
U.S. Citizens 90.7 88.3 89.6 87.4 89.3 84.9 78.8
Pennanent Visas 2.4 4.3 4.7 4.3 3.3 3.9 4.4
Tcmpomy Visas 4.6 4.5 3.8 4.2 4.7 6.4 9.3
Education
U.S. Citizens 94.5 94.6 94.6 90.6 90.3 86.6 84.7
Permanent Visas 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.5
Temporary Visas 4.3 3.5 3.4 4.2 5.7 7.9 7.1
Professional and Other
U.S. Citizens 82.5 81.9 78.2 80.3 80.0 76.5 70.8
Permanent Visas 2.2 3.9 5.5 4.8 3.9 3.7 4.8
Temporary Visas 13.3 9.6 12.7 9.5 13.7 14.0 15.6
*Detai1sdo not add to 100 percent where citizenship is unknown.
Source: National Academy of Science
U.S. Citizen Permanent Visa Temporary Visa
Field 1977 1986 1977 1986 1977 1986
Total, All Fields 94.9 92.4 85.4 74.5 23.7 35.6
Physical Sciences 97.1 96.0 84.0 80.9 25.5 49.6
Engineering 96.3 95.3 94.1 84.3 48.6 53.7
Life Sciences 94.1 93.9 75.4 56.1 9.2 13.1
Social Sciences 94.3 92.6 85.1 74.7 21.6 28.2
Humanities 92.7 89.6 87.3 74.2 21.1 27.1
Education 95.2 90.8 62.2 52.8 8.1 8.2
Professional Fields 95.5 92.8 85.4 80.0 21.4 48.4
.. Percentage based on total reporting definite postgraduation plans (17,215 doctorate
recipientS in 1977 and 15,981 in 1986).
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Table 6. Percentage of Doctorate Recipients with Employment Commitments in
the U.S., by Citizenship and Broad Field, 1977 and 1986*
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high but there is some signs that the trend is falling (from 85.4 percent
in 1977 to 74.5 percent in 1986). There is always the chance that non
citizens with advanced training and education will elect to return to their
homelands. Thus, there is a danger for the nation in becoming too dependent
on the foreign born as a source of highly trained personnel. It is also
a sorry comment on the nation's own educational system that it cannot prepare
a sufficient number of citizens to fill these highly paid and relatively
job secure occupations. Relatedly, there is also concern being raised that
the nation is subsidizing the training of technical human resources for
competitor nations. John Diebold, an internationally known business
consultant, has seriously suggested that the United States should charge
a fee (he suggests $50,000 for every foreign born scientist and engineer
who is trained in the United states who returns to his or her homeland to
work if they come from industrialized nations such as Japan, Britain, and
West Germany).
Thus, immigration is having a dual impact on the labor force of the
U.s. At one end of the spectrum it is pouring in persons with little skill
or education for whom it is doubtful that there is much need and for whom
there is likely to be a high cost. At the other end of the spectrum, the
nation is becoming heavily dependent on the foreign born to fill many of
its most skilled and technical occupations and from whom the country is
clearly benefitting.
At this point in time, the decline in the number of u.s. citizens earning
doctorates cannot be attributed to demography (see Table 7). As the National
Academy of Sciences has noted, the population pool (i.e., the age cohort
for 24 to 35 years of age) has been increasing dramatically over the past
twenty years. Hence, the explanation for the decline is tied to the absence
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Table 7. Trends In The Number of U.S. and Permanent-resident Ph.D.s and in
The Comparable U.S. Population. 1962-1986.
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of a comprehensive national human resource development policy.
The OVerall Picture
As a result of the aforementioned developments, the overall labor force
participation for the u.s. population reached an all time high of 65.3 percent
in 1986. The comparable rate for 1950 was 59.7 percent; for 1960 it was
60.0 percent; for 1970 it was 61.0 percent; and for 1980 it was 64.1 percent.
Never in the country's history have so many persons -- in both percentage
and absolute terms -- sought to work. It is likely that both figures will
continue to rise for the aforementioned reasons in the decade ahead. As
a consequence, the economy of the United States will continue to be under
relentless pressure to create sufficient job opportunities for the burgeoning
number of job seekers.
The Worrisome Exception
There is, however, one disturbing counter-trend that is buried in the
euphoria over the rising labor force participation rate of the overall u.s.
population. It has been the persistently lower labor force participation
rate of black males relative to white males. Historically through the 1940s,
the black male labor force participation rate consistently exceeded that
of white males. But since the 1950s, the white male rate has passed the
black rate and the gap between the two has widened considerably. By 1986,
the white male rate exceeded the black male rate by 5.7 percentage points
(76.9 percent to 71.2 percent). The wide gap exists for every age grouping.
Indicative of the significance of this decline in black male participation
is the fact that the absolute number of black men in the labor force just
barely exceeds that of black women (6.3 million black males to 6.2 million
black females in the labor force in 1986).
All things being equal, there is no reason why white males should have
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significantly higher participation rate for every age cohort than do black
males or should have a considerably higher overall rate. But, of course,
all things have not been equal. Blacks are clustered disproportionately
in the inner cities of 12 major cities plus being scattered over the large
geographic area of the rural South. Jobs in these locations are frequently
scarce. But jobs are especially hard to find if one has few skills and little
education and if there are limited opportunities to acquire or to develop
latent abilities. Qualifying for the jobs is made more difficult if there
are lingering practices of racial discrimination. It is also likely that
the new wave of immigrants -- especially illegal immigrants -- who have also
disproportionately settled in inner city areas have increased the competition
for jobs at the entry level. Under these conditions, an inordinate number
of black males apparently have despaired from seeking work in the regular
economy.
There is, of course, an ominous societal implication to these low black
male participation rates. If adult black males are not at work, or in school,
or in the military, what are they doing to survive? It seems that an urban
sub-class of adult black males who function outside the normal labor market
has formed and institutionalized its existence through irregular activities
such as crime, alcoholism, and drug addiction. Salvaging those black male
adults who can be re-attracted into the regular labor market and preventing
many black male youths of the present generation from succumbing to a similar
fate represents one of the major policy challenges of contemporary times.
Final Thoughts
The continuing growth of the civilian labor has placed the U.S. economy
under severe strain to provide a sufficient number of jobs for those who
seek them. Moreover, matching job seekers with available jobs is not always
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automatic. The rapidly changing composition of the civilian labor force
has complicated the matching process. It is anticipated that 80 percent
of the labor force entrants for the remainder of this century will be composed
of women, minorities, and immigrants. For a number of historical and
institutional reasons, members of these groups have usually had difficulty
securing the necessary job preparations and receiving fair opportunities
to compete for the jobs that are available. Hence, these changes in the
size and composition of the labor force dictate that qualitative human
resource policies -- such as education, training, retraining, labor
information, and labor mobility programs -- become integral components of
national economic policy. The traditional reliance on fiscal and monetary
policies that focus only on the demand for labor are unlikely to assure
satisfactory labor force adjustment. Human resource policies specifically
designed to enhance the job qualifications of the emerging supply of labor
will be more necessary than ever before. If such policy endeavors are
undertaken on an enlarged scale from what currently exists and if they are
combined with rigid enforcement of the nation's equal employment opportunity
and immigration laws, the prospects for full employment, general prosperity,
and domestic tranquility are hopeful. If such steps are not taken and if
human resource policies are not given high and immediate priority, the logical
consequences are reasons for concern and, possibly, alarm.
